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Counterfactual Desirability
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science ( IF 3.4 ) Pub Date : 2017-06-01 , DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv023
Richard Bradley 1 , H Orri Stefánsson 2
Affiliation  

The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais paradox. In this article we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability-maximizing. We end the article by investigating the conditions necessary and sufficient for a desirability function to be a standard expected-utility function. It turns out that the additional conditions imply highly implausible epistemic principles. 1. Two Paradoxes of Rational Choice2. Jeffrey Desirability3. Counterfactuals 3.1. Probability and desirability of counterfactuals3.2. Representations4. Counterfactual-Dependent Preferences 4.1. Preference actualism and desirability maximization4.2. Modelling Allais's and Diamond’s preferences5. Ethical Actualism and Separability 5.1. Independence and additive separability5.2. Ethical actualism5.3. Expected utility, separability, and ethical actualism6. Concluding Remarks7. Appendix Two Paradoxes of Rational Choice Jeffrey Desirability Counterfactuals 3.1. Probability and desirability of counterfactuals3.2. Representations Probability and desirability of counterfactuals Representations Counterfactual-Dependent Preferences 4.1. Preference actualism and desirability maximization4.2. Modelling Allais's and Diamond’s preferences Preference actualism and desirability maximization Modelling Allais's and Diamond’s preferences Ethical Actualism and Separability 5.1. Independence and additive separability5.2. Ethical actualism5.3. Expected utility, separability, and ethical actualism Independence and additive separability Ethical actualism Expected utility, separability, and ethical actualism Concluding Remarks Appendix

中文翻译:

反事实的可取性

实际发生的事情的可取性通常受到可能发生的事情的影响。基于实际和反事实结果之间的这种价值依赖性的偏好为正统决策理论产生了一类问题,最著名的可能是所谓的阿莱悖论。在本文中,我们通过将 Richard Jeffrey 的决策理论扩展到反事实前景、对条件使用多维可能世界语义并表明对反事实考虑敏感的偏好仍然可以是合意性最大化来解决这些问题。我们通过研究使合意性函数成为标准预期效用函数的必要条件和充分条件来结束本文。事实证明,附加条件意味着非常难以置信的认知原则。1. 理性选择的两个悖论2。杰弗里合意性3。反事实 3.1。反事实的概率和可取性 3.2。4. 陈述 反事实依赖偏好 4.1。偏好现实主义和合意性最大化4.2。建模 Allais 和 Diamond 的偏好 5。道德现实主义和可分离性 5.1。独立性和附加分离性 5.2。伦理现实主义5.3。预期效用、可分离性和伦理现实主义6。结束语 7. 附录二理性选择悖论 Jeffrey Deirability Counterfactuals 3.1.反事实的概率和可取性 3.2。表示反事实的可能性和可取性表示反事实依赖的偏好 4.1。偏好现实主义和合意性最大化4.2。建模 Allais' s 和戴蒙德的偏好偏好现实主义和合意性最大化建模阿莱和戴蒙德的偏好伦理现实主义和可分离性 5.1。独立性和附加分离性 5.2。伦理现实主义5.3。预期效用、可分离性和伦理现实主义 独立性和可加性可分离性 伦理现实主义 预期效用、可分离性和伦理现实主义 结论 附录
更新日期:2017-06-01
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