Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of international development programming is expected to produce "evidence-based" insight for both policy and practice. While supportive of evidence-based decision making, critics of contemporary M&E practice charge that it reflects the development industry's deepening audit culture, causing deleterious effects. I offer the example of a democratization program in postwar Angola to examine how the design and conduct of M&E in this case reinforced social boundaries and hierarchies of power among the program's own staff members. These professional staff hierarchies effectively barred ground-level evidence noted by implementation agents from being incorporated into the program's formal knowledge base. The case demonstrates that monitoring and evaluation procedures within development programs, and perhaps in other bureaucracies, must be examined for their social uses and effects among practitioners. These effects not only weaken the production of actionable knowledge for development but, by reinforcing social inequalities within the very industry tasked to combat them, also structurally threaten the endeavor.

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参与被拒绝：国际发展监测和评估的专业界限

国际发展规划的监测和评估 (M&E) 有望为政策和实践产生“基于证据”的洞察力。在支持循证决策的同时，当代 M&E 实践的批评者指责它反映了发展行业不断深化的审计文化，造成了有害影响。我提供了战后安哥拉民主化计划的例子，以检验在这种情况下 M&E 的设计和实施如何加强了该计划自己工作人员之间的社会界限和权力等级。这些专业人员的等级制度有效地阻止了实施机构注意到的基层证据被纳入计划的正式知识库。该案例表明，必须检查发展计划内以及其他官僚机构中的监测和评估程序，以了解它们在从业者中的社会用途和影响。这些影响不仅削弱了用于发展的可操作知识的生产，而且通过加强负责打击它们的行业内的社会不平等，也从结构上威胁了这一努力。