Natural resource management has changed profoundly in recent decades emphasizing new legislation that transfers responsibilities to local user groups. In this article, I follow changing water policies to Namibia and show that the enactment of policy in local institutions deviates from community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) blueprints and design. To understand why, I examine the theoretical premises of CBNRM. CBNRM is informed by rational choice theory which isolates economic transactions (e.g., sharing water) and assumes that people design institutions for a specific good. However, in the communities I study ethnographically, people depend on sharing multiple resources. To better understand how the degree of sharing and institutional overlaps matter, I explore empirically the concept of institutional multiplexity. Institutional multiplexity describes the number of transactions between two households in a social network. The results reveal that almost all social networks are institutionally multiplex. Institutional multiplexity implies that people cannot separate the sharing of water from sharing in other domains. Institutional multiplexity hinders the implementation of design principles such as fixing boundaries, sharing costs proportional to use, and formal sanctioning. However, it also opens other means for governing nature through social control.

中文翻译：

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机构的多元化：社交网络和基于社区的自然资源管理。

近几十年来，自然资源管理发生了深刻的变化，着重强调了将责任转移给本地用户群体的新法规。在本文中，我遵循了纳米比亚不断变化的水资源政策，并表明地方机构制定的政策偏离了基于社区的自然资源管理（CBNRM）的蓝图和设计。为了理解原因，我研究了CBNRM的理论前提。CBNRM以理性选择理论为依据，该理论将经济交易（例如，共享水）隔离开来，并假设人们为特定商品设计机构。但是，在我的人种学研究社区中，人们依赖共享多种资源。为了更好地理解共享程度和机构重叠的重要性，我从经验上探讨了机构多元化的概念。制度的多元化描述了社交网络中两个家庭之间的交易数量。结果表明，几乎所有社交网络都是机构多元化的。制度的多重性意味着人们无法将水的共享与其他领域的共享区分开。制度上的多重性阻碍了设计原则的实施，例如固定边界，按使用比例分摊成本和正式制裁。但是，它也为通过社会控制来管理自然开辟了其他途径。制度上的多重性阻碍了设计原则的实施，例如固定边界，按使用比例分摊成本和正式制裁。但是，它也为通过社会控制来管理自然开辟了其他途径。制度上的多重性阻碍了设计原则的实施，例如固定边界，按使用比例分摊成本和正式制裁。但是，它也为通过社会控制来管理自然开辟了其他途径。