The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate different burden sharing rules with respect to abatement of carbon emissions. We evaluate seven different rules both in terms of their redistributive impact and by the extent to which they realize the aim of optimal abatement. We show that the Lindahl solution, where the burden sharing rule of carbon abatement is determined by each region’s willingness to pay, is to be preferred above the non-cooperative Nash outcome. Poor regions however would prefer the social planner outcome with a global permit market, because then the burden sharing rule has a secondary role of income redistribution by means of transfers from rich to poor, on top of its primary role of assigning abatement burdens. Based on these findings, we argue that in order to control global greenhouse gas emissions, the level of individual country emission abatement effort should be a function of their willingness to pay to curb climate change, rather than their historical emissions or ability to abate.

中文翻译：

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气候变化控制：Lindahl解决方案。

本文的主要目的是评估有关减少碳排放的不同负担分担规则。我们根据重新分配的影响以及实现最佳减排目标的程度评估了七个不同的规则。我们表明，Lindahl解决方案比非合作Nash结果更可取，在该解决方案中，减碳的负担分担规则由每个地区的支付意愿决定。但是，贫困地区更喜欢社会规划者在全球许可市场上的成果，因为在分配减轻负担的主要作用之上，负担分担规则通过从富人到穷人的转移而具有收入再分配的次要作用。基于这些发现，我们认为，为了控制全球温室气体排放量，