The extant literature has demonstrated that the logic of retaliation is a core feature of negative campaigning. Attacks by one side induce counterattacks by the other. Yet most research on the interactive nature of negative campaigning is limited to two-party competition and provides little theoretical justification for why political actors should respond to attacks with counterattacks. The present paper addresses these research gaps. We argue that the negativity bias in human information processing and the zero-sum nature of elections make retaliation a rational strategy. Importantly, these arguments also imply that retaliation may not be the only plausible response to attacks in multiparty systems. Rather, parties may prefer to react to attacks from one competitor by attacking another. To grasp empirically how being attacked and attacking are related, we conduct a highly disaggregated time series analysis of such instances while controlling for other factors that may influence actor behavior. Our analyses draw on several thousand party press releases issued during three national election campaigns in Austria, a typical European multiparty system. They show that retaliation is an important strategy also in multiparty politics. Yet in such context, parties do not exclusively follow a tit-for-tat approach but rather display more complex patterns of attack behavior.

中文翻译：

---

负面竞选活动和多方竞争中的报复逻辑。

现有文献表明，报复的逻辑是否定竞选活动的核心特征。一方的进攻引起另一方的反击。然而，大多数关于否定竞选活动的互动性质的研究仅限于两党竞争，并且几乎没有提供理论依据来说明为什么政治角色应该以反击来应对攻击。本论文解决了这些研究空白。我们认为，人类信息处理中的消极偏见和选举的零和性质使报复成为一种合理的策略。重要的是，这些论点还暗示，报复可能不是对多方系统中的攻击的唯一合理的回应。相反，当事方可能更愿意通过攻击另一个竞争对手来应对。为了从经验上把握被攻击和攻击之间的关系，我们在控制可能影响演员行为的其他因素的同时，对此类情况进行了高度分解的时间序列分析。我们的分析借鉴了奥地利（典型的欧洲多党制）在三场全国选举中发布的数千份党派新闻稿。他们表明，报复也是多党政治中的重要策略。然而，在这种情况下，各方并不仅仅遵循针锋相对的方法，而是表现出更复杂的攻击行为模式。典型的欧洲多党制。他们表明，报复也是多党政治中的重要策略。然而，在这种情况下，各方并不仅仅遵循针锋相对的方法，而是表现出更复杂的攻击行为模式。典型的欧洲多党制。他们表明，报复也是多党政治中的重要策略。然而，在这种情况下，各方并不仅仅遵循针锋相对的方法，而是表现出更复杂的攻击行为模式。