One of the most continually vexing problems in society is the variability with which citizens support endeavors that are designed to help a great number of people. In this article, we examine the twin roles of cooperative and antagonistic behavior in this variability. We find that each plays an important role, though their contributions are, understandably, at odds. It is this opposition that produces seeming unpredictability in citizen response to collective need. In fact, we suggest that careful consideration of the research allows one to often predict when efforts to provide a collectively beneficial good will succeed and when they will fail. To understand the dynamics of participation in response to collective need, it is necessary to distinguish between the primary types of need situations. A public good is an entity that relies in whole or in part on contributions to be provided. Examples of public goods are charities and public broadcasting. Public goods require that citizens experience a short-term loss (of their contribution) in order to realize a long-term gain (of the good). However, because everyone can use the good once it is provided, there is also an incentive to not contribute, let others give, and then take advantage of their efforts. This state of affairs introduces a conflict between doing what is best for oneself and what is best for the group. In a public goods situation, cooperation and antagonism impact how one resolves this conflict. The other major type of need situation is a common-pool resource problem. Here, a good is fully provided at the outset, and citizens may sample from it. The resource is usually, but not necessarily, partially replenished. Examples of replenished resources are drinking water and trees; examples of resources that are functionally not replenished are oil and minerals. Common-pool resources allow citizens to experience a short-term gain (by getting what they want in the early life of the resource) but also present the possibility of a long-term loss (if the resource dries up). As with public goods, there is thus a conflict between, on the one hand, acting in one's best interest and taking as much as one wants all the time and, on the other, acting for the good of the group, which requires taking a lesser amount so that the replenishment rate can keep up with the rate of use. As with public goods, both cooperation and antagonism affect this decision. With these situations in mind, we can now dig deeply into the dynamics of both cooperation and antagonism. Cooperation is one of the most heavily studied aspects of human behavior, yet despite this attention, there is much that is not understood about it, including its fundamental base. There are a number of different perspectives on the base. Interdependence theory argues that cooperation is driven by how one interprets the subjective value of the outcomes that will result from various combinations of behaviors. A person who sees a potential result of "50 to you, 50 to me" as "We both would do well" is more likely to cooperate than the person who sees it as "I would not outgain the other person." Self-control theory suggests that cooperation is a function of how well a person can resist the impulse to benefit now and delay gratification. Evolutionary theory takes many forms but revolves around the extent to which cooperation is adaptive. Finally, the appropriateness framework takes a cognitive approach and assumes that cooperation is determined by a combination of social-cognitive (interpretation of self and the situation) and decision-heuristic factors. We propose that it is possible to integrate across these approaches and understand cooperation as a behavior that is influenced by all of these factors as well as other dynamics, such as cultural mores and personality traits. Antagonism, as it relates to the collective welfare, is a phenomenon with a lesser history but one that is clearly influential. A number of facets of antagonism are relevant. Power, and its abuse, is a major factor, and a specific application to collective goods is the notion of a "gatekeeper," or a person who can completely determine whether a public good exists or a common-pool resource can be used. Gatekeepers tend to demand ample compensation from others in order for the good or resource to go forward. If this demand is resisted, as it often is, the end result is that the good is not provided or the resource not accessed. Another facet is the desire to see an out-group be harmed. Sometimes, this motivation is so strong that people will deny themselves a good outcome in order to see the harm occur. Why someone would want to see an out-group be harmed is debatable, but it may be attributable to a desire to be seen as a winner, or it may be a strategy designed to produce a net benefit for one's in-group. Emotions also play a role, with people tending to assume that out-group members have just basic emotions such as happiness and sadness and not secondary emotions such as guilt and shame. Because out-group members are emotionally simple, it is seen as acceptable to treat them badly. Complicating matters even further is that antagonism can sometimes be seen against in-group members who deviate, in either direction, from the group norm and against individuals who are behaving in a clearly selfless manner, like volunteers. A number of approaches have been proposed to the resolution of public goods problems. Structural solutions act to alter the basic dynamic of the dilemma by means of interventions such as rewards for cooperation, punishment for noncooperation, and selection of a single group member to chart a course of action for everyone. Third-party solutions involve the bringing in of an external agent to help determine how group members should behave. These agents may be more passive and merely suggest solutions, or they may be more active and dictate how decisions will be made, what decision will be made, or both. Finally, psychological solutions involve changing how people view the situation. We finish by discussing how policy makers can improve the chances of a publicly valuable good being supported. We particularly emphasize creation of a felt connection with future generations; clear demonstration of immediate and concrete consequences as a result of failure to provide the good; instillation of a sense of community; and isolation of the good from other, related issues. We also take up the general problem of distrust of those who establish policy and discuss some methods for helping minimize distrust.

中文翻译：

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合作，信任和对抗：如何促进公共物品。

社会上最令人困扰的问题之一是公民支持旨在帮助大量人民的各项努力的可变性。在本文中，我们研究了这种可变性中合作和对抗行为的双重作用。我们发现，每个人都扮演着重要角色，尽管可以理解的是，他们的贡献是不一致的。正是这种反对在公民对集体需求的反应中产生了看似不可预测的情况。实际上，我们建议仔细研究这项研究，可以使人们经常预测提供集体利益的努力何时会成功，何时会失败。为了了解参与对集体需求的响应的动态，有必要区分需求情况的主要类型。公共物品是一个全部或部分依赖于所提供捐助的实体。公共物品的例子有慈善机构和公共广播。公共物品要求公民经历短期（其贡献）损失，以实现长期（利益）收益。但是，由于每个人都可以使用提供的商品，因此也有一种动机，就是不捐钱，让别人奉献，然后利用自己的努力。这种状况导致在做对自己最好的事情和对团队最好的事情之间发生冲突。在公共物品的情况下，合作与对抗会影响人们如何解决这一冲突。需求情况的另一种主要类型是公共池资源问题。在这里，一开始就充分提供了商品，市民可以从中取样。该资源通常是 但不一定要部分补充。补充资源的例子有饮用水和树木。在功能上无法补充的资源的例子是石油和矿产。公用池资源使公民能够获得短期收益（通过在资源的早期获得所需的东西），但也存在长期损失的可能性（如果资源枯竭）。就像公共物品一样，一方面存在冲突，一方面是为了最大的利益行事，而另一方面则是为了所有人的利益行事，另一方面，为了集团的利益行事。较少的数量，以便补给率能跟上使用率。与公共物品一样，合作和对抗都会影响这一决定。考虑到这些情况，我们现在可以深入研究合作与对抗的动力。合作是人类行为研究最深入的方面之一，但是尽管有这种关注，但对它的很多了解，包括它的基本基础，还不为人所知。基础上有许多不同的观点。相互依赖理论认为，合作是由人们如何解释行为的各种组合所产生的结果的主观价值所驱动的。看到“对您有50个，对我有50个”的潜在结果为“我们俩都会做得很好”的人比看到“我不会超越另一个人”的人更愿意合作。自我控制理论表明，合作是一个人抵御冲动的能力的一种函数，这种冲动现在受益并延迟了满足。进化论采取多种形式，但围绕合作适应性的程度展开。最后，适当性框架采用认知方法，并假设合作是由社会认知（自我和情况的解释）和决策启发因素共同决定的。我们建议可以将这些方法整合在一起，并将合作理解为受所有这些因素以及其他动力（例如文化习俗和人格特质）影响的行为。与集体福利有关的对抗是一种历史较少的现象，但显然具有影响力。许多对抗方面是相关的。权力及其滥用是一个主要因素，对集体财产的特定应用是“看门人”的概念，或可以完全确定是否存在公共物品或公共游泳池资源的人员。守门人往往要求他人给予足够的补偿，以使财物或资源得以前进。如果这种需求经常被抵制，那么最终结果就是没有提供商品或没有访问资源。另一个方面是希望看到外部群体受到伤害。有时，这种动机如此强烈，以至于人们为了看到伤害而拒绝给自己一个好结果。为什么有人希望看到外部群体受到伤害是有争议的，但这可能归因于被视为获胜者的渴望，或者它可能是旨在为内部群体带来净收益的策略。情绪也起着作用，人们倾向于认为小组成员只有基本情绪，例如幸福和悲伤，而没有次要情绪，例如内和羞耻。由于小组外成员在情感上很简单，因此对他们进行恶劣对待被认为是可以接受的。使事情变得更加复杂的是，有时可以看到对向任何一方偏离群体规范的群体内成员以及对表现出明显无私行为的个人（例如志愿者）的对抗。已经提出了许多解决公共物品问题的方法。结构性解决方案通过干预（例如对合作的奖励，对不合作的惩罚以及选择单个小组成员为每个人制定行动方案）的干预措施来改变困境的基本动力。第三方解决方案涉及引入外部代理，以帮助确定组成员的行为方式。这些主体可能更被动，仅提出解决方案，或者可能更主动，并决定如何做出决定，做出什么决定，或两者兼而有之。最后，心理解决方案涉及改变人们对情况的看法。最后，我们讨论政策制定者如何才能提高支持公益性商品的机会。我们特别强调与子孙后代建立亲密的联系；清楚地表明由于没有提供商品而造成的直接和具体的后果；灌输一种社区意识；并将商品与其他相关问题隔离开来。