【管理评论】物流与供应链管理｜线下到线上O2O供应链线上推荐策略及激励机制设计
线下到线上O2O供应链线上推荐策略及激励机制设计
Optimal Online Referral Strategy and Incentive Mechanism in Offline to Online (O2O) Supply Chain
作者介绍
金亮：南昌大学中国中部经济社会发展研究中心,南昌大学经济管理学院讲师,博士
摘 要
通过建立一个线上零售商与一个线下体验店之间的委托代理模型来研究"线下体验，线上购买"O2O供应链合作激励问题，并给出了不对称信息下的零售商最优线上推荐策略与佣金契约设计，进而考察了线上推荐对佣金契约设计、O2O供应链成员利润以及信息价值的影响。研究结果表明，线上推荐会影响零售商的最优佣金契约设计，导致佣金契约参数的变化；在一定条件下，线上推荐不仅能有效提升零售商与O2O供应链系统的利润（线上推荐价值），而且还有助于缓解零售商信息劣势对其造成不利影响；体验店通过策略性地调整其体验服务努力水平，使得线上推荐总是不会对其产生不利。最后，通过算例对佣金契约参数与O2O供应链成员绩效进行了直观考察和说明。
关键词 ：O2O供应链, 线上推荐, 不对称信息, 佣金契约
基金资助
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目（19YJC630067；19YJC630229）
江西省高校人文社科重点研究基地项目（JD18014）
Abstract
Focusing on the offline to online (O2O) supply chain composed of an online retailer and a showroom, a principal-agent model based on game theory is established to optimize the design of incentive mechanism. The aim is to design the optimal commission contract and online referral effort and analyze the effect of online retailer's referral on the commission contract, profits of both partners and information value. The results show that, under certain conditions, online referral is able to improve the online retailer's expected profit and O2O supply chain's performance, and also decrease the retailer's loss due to asymmetric information. Meanwhile, to adjust the offline evaluate service based on the online referral, online referral does not always decrease the showroom's expected profit. Finally, a numerical example is given to illuminate the optimal commission contract and profits of both partners.
Key words：O2O supply chain, online referral, asymmetric information, commission contract
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