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Yoyo attack on 4-round Lai-Massey scheme with secret round functions

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Abstract

In this study, we present the first yoyo attack to recover the secret round function of the 4-round Lai-Massey scheme with an affine orthomorphism. We first perform a yoyo attack on 3-round Lai-Massey scheme. However, the original method for constructing plaintext equations is not sufficiently effective. To solve this problem, we partition the ciphertext and plaintext spaces into \(2^{n}\) subsets, which provides a fresh perspective on our yoyo attack. From this perspective, our study presents two improvements. One is that we devise an improved yoyo game in which the established ciphertext pool significantly narrows the search of good pairs compared with random selection, and the inserted filter can eliminate all wrong pairs using simple XOR calculations. Consequently, the yoyo game is advantageous for reducing the complexity of seeking good pairs, and we can avoid the complexity involved in solving equations generated using wrong pairs. The other is that we present a valid method for solving equations, which helps to reduce the number of yoyos required to recover the first-round function. After removing the first round, the look-up tables of the remaining two round functions of the 3-round Lai-Massey scheme can be retrieved by selecting the inputs and accessing the outputs. On the basis of this attack, we mount a yoyo attack on the 4-round Lai-Massey scheme to recover the fourth-round function and then apply the above attack to the remaining three rounds. In general, the complete recovery of the 4-round Lai-Massey scheme requires time complexity O\((k_{1}2^{2n})\) and memory O\((2^{2n})\), where \(n\le k_{1}<2^{n}\).

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments.

Funding

This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 62372157).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Mathematics and Information Science, Henan Normal University, Xinxiang, 453007, People’s Republic of China

    Le Dong & Danxun Zhang

  2. PLA information engineering university, Zhengzhou, 450000, People’s Republic of China

    Wenya Li

  3. Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100190, People’s Republic of China

    Wenling Wu

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Dong, L., Zhang, D., Li, W. et al. Yoyo attack on 4-round Lai-Massey scheme with secret round functions. Des. Codes Cryptogr. (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10623-024-01408-8

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