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A game of raids: Expanding on a game theoretical approach utilising the prisoner's dilemma and ethnography in situ
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 January 2024
Abstract
In this commentary, we set out the specifics of how Glowacki's game theoretical framework for the evolution of peace could be incorporated within broader cultural evolutionary approaches. We outline a formal proposal for prisoner's dilemma games investigating raid-based conflict. We also centre an ethnographic lens to understand the norms surrounding war and peace in intergroup interactions in small-scale communities.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
The evolution of peace
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Author response
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