Abstract
The function of concepts must be taken seriously to understand the scientific practices of developing and working with concepts. Despite its significance, little philosophical attention has been paid to the function of concepts. A notable exception is Brigandt (2010), who suggests incorporating the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use as an additional semantic property along with the reference and inferential role. The suggestion, however, has at least two limitations. First, his proposal to introduce epistemic goals as the third component of concepts lacks independent grounding, except to account for the rationality of semantic change (the Grounding Problem). Second, it is hardly justified to consider epistemic goals as a semantic property (the Misplacement Problem). To remedy these predicaments, we suggest a new perspective that takes concepts as cognitive entities with a 2-layered structure rather than as merely linguistic entities and develop an account of the function of concepts. We provide empirical evidence showing that functional information affects our cognitive processes. It is claimed that the function of concepts is not a semantic property but a type of meta-information regulating a body of concept-constitutive information.
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Notes
Interestingly, there has been a noteworthy shift in recent literature on conceptual engineering, as scholars have begun to emphasize the conceptual or linguistic function, which can serve explanatory or normative purposes (Simion & Kelp, 2020; Riggs, 2021; Thomasson, 2022). For a critical discussion, see also Cappelen (2018). It should be clear that this paper primarily pertains to the realm of philosophy of science rather than conceptual engineering. Furthermore, the basic idea underlying this article stems from my doctoral dissertation on scientific concepts (Cheon, 2014), which preceded the recent surge of interest in function among conceptual engineers.
This kind of evaluation depends on the instrumental conception of rationality. Some might wonder whether rationality can be understood completely in terms of a means-ends analysis. However, the debate about whether epistemic rationality is reducible to instrumental rationality is another issue (see Siegel, 1996; Kelly, 2003; Laudan, 1990).
One reviewer points out that Brigandt is motivated to build on Brandom’s pragmatic account of concepts and thus accounting for the rationality of conceptual changes is not the only reason for introducing the third element. However, this paper concerns whether the introduction of function is well grounded in (psychological) reality.
Relatedly, Brigandt provides no detailed account of epistemic goals. Of course, as he mentions, the goals are assigned collectively by a group of scientists during a particular period of time. Still, there is no explanation for what the goals are like or how to identify and individuate them. For example, Brigandt correctly notes that the epistemic goal pursued by the use of the gene concept in classical genetics was to predict inheritance patterns. Given that geneticists pursued several epistemic goals (e.g., understanding the biological world), it is unclear how an epistemic goal became tied to a particular concept.
As one reviewer pointed out, we can make the characterizations of descriptivism and externalism more precise. For example, we can draw the distinction between the definite description theory of reference of proper names and the use theory of meaning. Additionally, we can distinguish the pure causal theory of reference from more nuanced versions like causal-descriptivism. However, while acknowledging that the distinction made above may be somehow simplistic, I believe that they suffice for our purposes of discussion.
Infamously, there is no agreed-upon definition of information, and it has different meanings in different contexts. For the sake of argument, it is enough to adopt the data-based definition: information is well-formed and meaningful data (Floridi, 2011). By “information-complex”, I mean a structured body of information instead of a mere collection of information.
It should be obvious that I apply Machery (2009)’s characterization of ordinary concepts to scientific contexts, as he articulates how the theoretical term “concept” is used in the psychological literature: “A concept of x is a body of information [knowledge] about x that is stored in long-term memory, and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, if not all, higher cognitive competence when these processes result in judgments about x” (Machery, 2009, 12).
One reviewer raised a question like: “if concepts are bodies of information, then how do we account for two people having the same concepts?” My answer is two-folded. First, given that my view is based on mental representation view of concept, the sameness of the represented makes for the sameness of concepts of two people. For example, Bob’s concept of x and Sally’s concept of x can be the same in that both of them are about x. Second, even if Bob’s information-complex about x is different from Sally’s information-complex about x, they have the same scientific concept of x when they are two competent members of a scientific community. The question of who qualifies as a competent member needs additional treatment, which goes beyond the scope of this article.
Philosophers of science tend to adopt a particular theory of concepts. However, when it comes to considering the cognitive science of concepts in its entirety, we observe that different theories of concepts are still competing (Murphy, 2002; Prinz, 2002; Machery, 2009). Various theories assume different structural MI about how concept-constitutive information is organized. Cheon and Machery (2016) argues for the structural heterogeneity of scientific concepts.
Nerssessian also addresses the function of concepts when she states that the function of the electromagnetic field is to transmit electromagnetic actions through space (Andersen & Nersessian, 2000, S235). However, it remains ambiguous whether it pertains to the proper function or the functional role, and whether it is the functional role of the concept of electromagnetic field or the functional role of its reference (the electromagnetic field).
Consider a fast-moving stream in which a small rock supports a larger rock: without the small rock, the larger rock would be washed away. In Wright’s analysis, the small rock’s function is supporting the larger rock because it is what the small rock does and explains why it is there.
A reviewer expressed concern about the inclusion of child development narrowing the scope by emphasizing human biology. However, it is not accurate. The modification in the first condition consists of the shift from a reproductively established family (EF1) to a developmentally established family (EF1*). While history (EF1) previously referred to a selective context, the developmental process in a broad sense (EF1*) encompasses not only the history of natural selection but the human history, science education, and child development. Consequently, the notion of a developmentally established family should be understood as an extended notion of a historically established family.
This type of selection can be referred to as “virtual selection.“ It describes the collective processes by which people contemplate several competing alternatives and select one based on their best estimate of expected competence. Although virtual selection differs from actual selection, the two forms of selection are similar enough for our purposes.
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Cheon, H. The Function of Scientific Concepts. Found Sci (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09929-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09929-6