Evolutionary theory predicts competition in nature yet altruistic and cooperative behaviour appears to reduce the ability to compete in order to help others compete better. This evolutionary puzzle is usually explained by kin selection where close relatives perform altruistic and cooperative acts to help each other and by reciprocity theory (i.e. direct, indirect and generalized reciprocity) among non‐kin. Here, it is proposed that the concepts of asymmetry and symmetry in power and dominance are critical if we are ever to resolve the puzzle of altruism and cooperation towards non‐kin. Asymmetry in power and dominance is likely to emerge under competition in nature as individuals strive to gain greater access to the scarce resources needed to survive and reproduce successfully. Yet asymmetric power presents serious problems for reciprocity theory in that a dominant individual faces a temptation to cheat in interactions with subordinates that is likely to far outweigh any individual selective benefits gained through reciprocal mechanisms. Furthermore, action taken by subordinates to deter non‐reciprocation by dominants is likely to prove prohibitively costly to their fitness, making successful enforcement of reciprocal mechanisms unlikely. It is also argued here that many apparently puzzling forms of cooperation observed in nature (e.g. cooperative breeding in which unrelated subordinates help dominants to breed) might be best explained by asymmetry in power and dominance. Once it is recognized that individuals in these cooperative interactions are subject to the constraints and opportunities imposed on them by asymmetric power then they can be seen as pursuing a ‘least bad’ strategy to promote individual fitness – one that is nevertheless consistent with evolutionary theory. The concept of symmetric power also provides important insights. It can inhibit reciprocal mechanisms in the sense that symmetric power makes it easier for a cheat to appropriate common resources while incurring fewer penalties. Nevertheless under certain restrictive conditions, symmetric power is seen as likely to promote direct reciprocity through ‘tit for tat’.

中文翻译：

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非对称和对称权力的概念可以帮助解决利他行为和合作行为的难题

进化论预测自然界存在竞争，但利他和合作行为似乎会降低竞争能力，以帮助他人更好地竞争。这个进化难题通常可以通过亲属选择来解释，其中近亲采取利他主义和合作行为来互相帮助，以及非亲属之间的互惠理论（即直接、间接和广义互惠）。在这里，如果我们要解决对非亲属的利他主义和合作的难题，那么权力和支配地位的不对称和对称概念是至关重要的。在自然界的竞争中，权力和支配地位的不对称很可能出现，因为个人努力获得更多地获得成功生存和繁殖所需的稀缺资源。然而，不对称的权力给互惠理论带来了严重的问题，因为占主导地位的个人在与下属的互动中面临欺骗的诱惑，这可能远远超过通过互惠机制获得的任何个人选择性利益。此外，下属为阻止支配者的不互惠而采取的行动可能会证明他们的健康代价高得令人望而却步，使得互惠机制的成功实施不太可能。这里也有人认为，自然界中观察到的许多明显令人费解的合作形式（例如，不相关的下属帮助优势群体繁殖的合作繁殖）可能最好用权力和支配地位的不对称来解释。一旦认识到在这些合作互动中的个体受到不对称权力强加给他们的约束和机会，那么他们就可以被视为追求一种“最不坏”的策略来促进个体适应度——但这种策略与进化论是一致的。对称功率的概念也提供了重要的见解。它可以抑制互惠机制，因为对称权力使作弊者更容易占用公共资源，同时受到较少的惩罚。然而，在某些限制条件下，对称权力被视为可能通过“以牙还牙”促进直接互惠。对称功率的概念也提供了重要的见解。它可以抑制互惠机制，因为对称权力使作弊者更容易占用公共资源，同时受到较少的惩罚。然而，在某些限制条件下，对称权力被视为可能通过“以牙还牙”促进直接互惠。对称功率的概念也提供了重要的见解。它可以抑制互惠机制，因为对称权力使作弊者更容易占用公共资源，同时受到较少的惩罚。然而，在某些限制条件下，对称权力被视为可能通过“以牙还牙”促进直接互惠。