Should we make significant sacrifices to ever-so-slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever-so-slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? Fanaticism says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I evaluate the prospects for Fanaticism, in connection with two other kinds of general ethical principles. First, separability principles, which say that which option is best does not depend in strange ways on what might be going on in distant space and time—jumping off from a recent argument for Fanaticism from Beckstead and Thomas (2023). Second, reflection principles, about how gaining new information makes a difference to which options are best—jumping off from a recent argument for Fanaticism from Wilkinson (2022). It turns out that the situation is unstable: plausible general separability and reflection principles actually tell against Fanaticism, but restrictions of those same principles (with strengthened auxiliary assumptions) support Fanaticism. All of the consistent views that emerge are very strange.

中文翻译：

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关于狂热主义的两个论据

我们应该做出重大牺牲来稍微降低极坏结果的可能性，还是稍微提高极好的结果的可能性？狂热主义说是：对于每一个糟糕的结果，都有极小的可能性会导致更糟糕的极端灾难，而对于每一个好的结果，都有可能会产生更好的巨大好处。我结合其他两种一般伦理原则评估了狂热主义的前景。首先，可分离性原则表明哪个选项最好并不以奇怪的方式依赖于遥远空间和时间可能发生的事情——从 Beckstead 和 Thomas (2023) 最近对狂热主义的争论中跳出来的。二、反思原则，关于获取新信息如何影响最佳选择——从 Wilkinson (2022) 最近对狂热主义的争论中跳出来。事实证明情况是不稳定的：似是而非的一般可分离性和反射原则实际上反对狂热主义，但这些相同原则的限制（加强辅助假设）支持狂热主义。所有出现的一致观点都非常奇怪。