Violations in business-to-peer (B2P) product sharing such as theft and vandalism may cause firm bankruptcy and social welfare reductions. Taking bike-sharing as an example, this paper develops a non-atomic game model to characterize the collective behaviors of rational consumers and investigates how to inhibit violations in the B2P market. We assume that individuals are heterogeneous in the expected punishment cost, and each individual can choose to be a compliant consumer, violating consumer, or a non-use consumer. The equilibrium results reveal that lowering the price and increasing the initial number of shared products can suppress violations, however, the firm profit is maximized when violators are reduced to a certain percentage, which diverges somewhat from social welfare. To further eliminate violations, the subsidy mechanism is introduced, which can efficiently reduce the ratio of violators while increasing both the firm profit and social welfare, even though the firm’s response to subsidy weakens its effect, and the increase in social welfare exceeds the investment in subsidies.

盗窃和破坏等企业对点 (B2P) 产品共享的违规行为可能会导致公司破产和社会福利减少。以共享单车为例，本文开发了一种非原子博弈模型来刻画理性消费者的集体行为，并研究如何抑制B2P市场中的违规行为。我们假设个体的预期惩罚成本是异质的，每个个体都可以选择成为合规消费者、违规消费者或不使用消费者。均衡结果表明，降低价格和增加初始共享产品数量可以抑制违规行为，但当违规者减少到一定比例时，企业利润最大化，这与社会福利有所偏离。为进一步杜绝违规行为，引入补贴机制，