Many philosophers think that we should use a lottery to decide who gets a good to which two persons have an equal claim but which only one person can get. Some philosophers think that we should save identified persons from harm even at the expense of saving a somewhat greater number of statistical persons from the same harm. I defend a principled way of justifying both judgements, namely, by appealing to the decreasing marginal moral value of survival chances. I identify four desiderata that, I contend, any such justification should satisfy, and explain how my account meets these desiderata, unlike some previous accounts.

中文翻译：

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确定的人“偏见”是机会的边际价值递减

许多哲学家认为，我们应该用彩票来决定谁得到一件物品，两个人有同等的权利，但只有一个人可以得到。一些哲学家认为，我们应该拯救已识别的人免受伤害，即使是以拯救更多的统计人员免受同样的伤害为代价。我捍卫一种原则性的方式来证明这两种判断的合理性，即诉诸生存机会的边际道德价值递减。我确定了四个必要条件，我认为，任何此类理由都应该满足，并解释我的叙述如何满足这些必要条件，这与以前的一些叙述不同。