Loan guarantees represent a form of government intervention to support bank lending. However, their use raises concerns as to their effect on bank risk-taking incentives. In a model of financial fragility that incorporates bank capital and a bank incentive problem, we show that loan guarantees reduce depositor runs and improve bank underwriting standards, except for the most poorly capitalized banks. We highlight a novel feedback effect between banks’ underwriting choices and depositors’ run decisions, and show that the effect of loan guarantees on banks’ incentives is different from that of other types of guarantees, such as deposit insurance.

中文翻译：

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贷款担保、银行承销政策和金融稳定

贷款担保是政府干预支持银行贷款的一种形式。然而，它们的使用引起了人们对其对银行冒险激励的影响的担忧。在包含银行资本和银行激励问题的金融脆弱性模型中，我们表明贷款担保减少存款人挤兑并提高银行承保标准，但资本最薄弱的银行除外。我们强调了银行的承保选择与储户的运行决策之间的一种新颖的反馈效应，并表明贷款担保对银行激励的影响不同于其他类型的担保，例如存款保险。