Due to emission reduction pressure and supply chain changes, this paper analyzes the development trend of the marine supply chain based on the competition and cooperation incentives of carriers, considering the impact of the government’s carbon tax policy. We consider multi-stage Stackelberg games with different power structures consisting of a government, hub port, and two carriers. Equilibrium solutions for different power structures show that carriers tend to build alliance and compete with the port for leadership. Higher bargaining power is the dominant choice for all companies, and neither the port nor carrier alliance accepts the other as the leader. Thus, they compromise on equal bargaining. To resolve the conflicting interests of stakeholders, we examine the reasons for revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts that cannot coordinate the marine supply chain, and redesign the subsidy and revenue-sharing contracts. Higher subsidies and revenue-sharing proportions can make carriers give up competing for leadership, or even forming an alliance. The contract provides a new solution for companies’ strategic decision-making beyond equal bargaining. Numerical analyses suggest that although the contract weakens the effect of the carbon tax, promoting deeper cooperation between companies is a better option for the government. Finally, we verify the reasons for the failure of the carbon tax policy after the government failed to consider the market environment, and summarize the development direction of the marine supply chain under a reasonable carbon tax to provide management insights for stakeholders. Further, the model is extended to prove the validity and robustness of recommendations to the government and companies. New incentives are provided for companies’ integrates cooperation.

由于减排压力和供应链变化，本文基于承运人的竞争与合作激励，考虑政府碳税政策的影响，分析海洋供应链的发展趋势。我们考虑具有不同权力结构的多阶段 Stackelberg 博弈，包括政府、枢纽港和两个承运人。不同权力结构的均衡解表明，承运人倾向于建立联盟并与港口竞争领导地位。更高的议价能力是所有企业的主导选择，无论是港口联盟还是航运联盟都不接受对方为龙头。因此，他们在平等谈判上妥协。为了解决利益相关者的利益冲突，我们研究了收入共享和成本共享合同无法协调海洋供应链的原因，并重新设计了补贴和收入共享合同。更高的补贴和收入分成比例可以让运营商放弃争夺领导地位​​，甚至结盟。该合同为企业的战略决策提供了一种超越平等谈判的新解决方案。数值分析表明，虽然合同削弱了碳税的影响，但促进企业间更深入的合作对政府来说是一个更好的选择。最后，我们验证政府未能考虑市场环境而导致碳税政策失败的原因，总结合理碳税下海洋供应链的发展方向，为利益相关方提供管理思路。此外，该模型被扩展以证明对政府和公司的建议的有效性和稳健性。为企业整合合作提供新动力。