This paper constitutes the very first treatment of the Shapley–Shubik (1977) market-game mechanism with a continuum of commodities. We develop an oligopolistic-competition model in which product prices are endogenously determined, via buyers’ and sellers’ strategic decisions, and we lay down and examine its mathematical structure. Taking agents’ market power into account, we restudy the Ricardian Law of Comparative Advantage in a many-commodity framework, and obtain a (new) result that is in line with what is perceived in real-world markets: when agents act strategically, they do not specialise based on comparative advantages. For a large class of utility functions, we prove the existence of equilibria at all of which trade is driven neither by absolute nor comparative advantages, but exclusively by strategic decision-making.

本文首次对具有商品连续体的 Shapley-Shubik (1977) 市场博弈机制进行了处理。我们开发了一种寡头垄断竞争模型，其中产品价格是通过买家和卖家的战略决策内生决定的，并且我们制定并检查了其数学结构。考虑到代理人的市场力量，我们在多商品框架中重新研究李嘉图比较优势定律，并获得与现实市场中感知一致的（新）结果：当代理人采取战略行动时，他们并不基于比较优势进行专业化。对于一大类效用函数，我们证明了均衡的存在，其中贸易既不是由绝对优势也不是由比较优势驱动，而是完全由战略决策驱动。