Sometimes, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems like a demand to have that attitude. But in other cases, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems more like a permission to have the attitude. I defend a proposal that can accommodate both of these appearances. I argue that there is a kind of emotionlessness, which I call apathy, that can be fitting or unfitting in just the same way that emotion can. I further argue that, in some cases, it can be fitting to respond a single object either with emotion or with apathy. When both apathy and emotion are fitting options, the fittingness of the emotion is a permission-like status; failures to have the fitting emotion are not failures of fit. But when an emotion is fitting and apathy is unfitting, the fittingness of the emotion is a demand-like status; failures to have the emotion are failures of fit.

有时，一种态度合适的事实似乎是对拥有这种态度的要求。但在其他情况下，一种态度合适的事实似乎更像是一种拥有这种态度的许可。我捍卫一个可以兼顾这两种情况的提案。我认为有一种冷漠，我称之为冷漠，这可以像情绪一样适合或不适合。我进一步争辩说，在某些情况下，以情感或冷漠来回应单个对象可能是合适的。当冷漠和情绪都是合适的选择时，情绪的合适是一种类似许可的状态；没有合适的情绪并不是合适的失败。但是当一种情绪合适而冷漠不合适时，这种情绪的合适就是一种需求状态；没有情感是不合适的。