We regularly make graded normative judgements in the epistemic domain. Recent work in the literature examines degrees of justification, degrees of rationality, and degrees of assertability. This paper addresses a different dimension of the gradeability of epistemic normativity, one that has been given little attention. How should we understand degrees of epistemic criticizability? In virtue of what sorts of factors can one epistemic failing be worse than another? The paper develops a dual-factor view of degrees of epistemic criticizability. According to the view, degrees of epistemic criticizability are (i) an inverse function of degrees of doxastic justification and (ii) a function of degrees of agent culpability. The paper develops an account of each factor, and explains how they should be weighted. The paper also addresses the importance of modelling degrees of epistemic criticizability in a broader context. I focus on the role that such a model can play in the ethics of epistemic criticism.

中文翻译：

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认知批判的程度

我们经常在认知领域做出分级规范判断。文献中最近的工作检查了证明的程度、合理的程度和可断言的程度。本文讨论了认知规范性的可分级性的不同维度，该维度很少受到关注。我们应该如何理解认知批判性的程度？由于何种因素，一种认知失败会比另一种更糟？本文提出了认知批判性程度的双因素观点。根据该观点，认知可批判性的程度是 (i) 信念辩护程度的反函数和 (ii) 代理人过失程度的函数。本文对每个因素进行了说明，并解释了应如何对它们进行加权。该论文还讨论了在更广泛的背景下对认知批判性程度进行建模的重要性。我关注的是这种模型在认知批评伦理中可以发挥的作用。