Rights and Demands is a rich and illuminating inquiry into fundamental questions about the meaning and sources of rights. It continues Gilbert's groundbreaking investigations into the social phenomenon she calls “joint commitment.” The focus of the book is the distinctive rights to which, in her view, joint commitments give rise. Although Gilbert's main claims are often modestly hedged, many of them are radical. For example (most centrally): “It is at least not clear that demand-rights exist outside the realm of joint commitment” (343). “If we want human beings…to have the relevant demand-rights against other human beings….then the only means to achieve this may well be the creation of joint commitments that do not yet exist” (342). (I've emphasized the hedges.)

As behooves the critic, my comments will focus on two points of disagreement with Gilbert's claims. I am unpersuaded that demand-rights arise only from joint commitments. Furthermore, I am unpersuaded that joint commitments always create demand-rights.

In Gilbert's terminology, to have a demand-right against someone is to have “the standing to demand a particular action from that person” (11). These rights correlate with “directed” obligations. That is, those who are subject to rights of this kind are not only obligated to refrain from violating those rights; they are obligated to the right-holder. Joint commitments obtain in virtue of agreements, promises, or other forms of “acting together” (11). What these transactions have in common is their expression of “readiness for joint commitments, in conditions of common knowledge” (273).

Gilbert's central claim, then, is that if anyone has the standing to demand a particular action from any other, then that standing has been given by transactions of one of these kinds. Her argument for this position is this. “A demand-right requires a ground; it cannot just ‘be there’” (346). The only convincing ground so far uncovered for demand-rights is joint commitment. It is therefore a reasonable hypothesis that demand-rights only originate in that way.

From this conclusion, it is a short step to another important thesis to which much of Part III of the book is devoted, that there are no moral demand-rights All that is needed is the further premise, which Gilbert endorses, that moral obligations and rights cannot be “willed” into existence. They therefore cannot be upshots of joint commitment. But if that's the only source of demand-rights, as it appears to Gilbert to be, moral demand-rights are impossible.

This conclusion is startling. It seems to conflict with central and basic tenets of interpersonal morality. “Seems to conflict,” I say, because “demand-rights” is after all a technical term, and once articulated, the conclusion may not be (as) at odds with our common moral views as it initially sounds. I think this is more or less Gilbert's position.

That apparent conflict will be the focus of my first set of comments. My second set of comments concerns Gilbert's views on the normative import of joint commitments (agreements and the like) and their relation to moral requirements.

权利与要求是对有关权利的含义和来源的基本问题的丰富而富有启发性的探究。它延续了吉尔伯特对她称之为“共同承诺”的社会现象的开创性调查。这本书的重点是在她看来，共同承诺产生的独特权利。尽管吉尔伯特的主要主张经常被适度地对冲，但其中许多是激进的。例如（最重要的）：“至少不清楚联合承诺范围之外是否存在要求权”（343）。“如果我们希望人类……拥有针对其他人的相关需求权利……那么实现这一目标的唯一方法很可能是建立尚不存在的共同承诺”（342）。（我强调了树篱。）

作为评论家，我的评论将集中在与吉尔伯特的主张不一致的两点上。我不相信请求权仅来自共同承诺。此外，我不相信联合承诺总是会产生需求权。

用吉尔伯特的术语来说，拥有针对某人的要求权就是拥有“要求该人采取特定行动的资格”（11）。这些权利与“定向”义务相关。也就是说，享有此类权利的人不仅有义务不侵犯这些权利；他们对权利人负有义务。共同承诺通过协议、承诺或其他形式的“共同行动”获得 (11)。这些交易的共同点是它们表达了“在共同知识的条件下准备共同承诺”（273）。

那么，吉尔伯特的核心主张是，如果任何人有资格要求任何其他人采取特定行动，那么这种地位已经由其中一种交易提供。她对这个职位的论点是这样的。“要求权需要理由；它不能只是‘在那里’”（346）。到目前为止，要求权利的唯一令人信服的理由是共同承诺。因此，请求权仅以这种方式产生是一个合理的假设。

从这个结论来看，本书第三部分的大部分内容都涉及另一个重要论点，即不存在道德要求权，所需要的只是吉尔伯特认可的进一步前提，即道德义务和权利不能通过“意志”而存在。因此，它们不可能是共同承诺的结果。但如果那是需求权利的唯一来源，就像吉尔伯特所认为的那样，道德需求权利是不可能的。

这个结论令人吃惊。这似乎与人际道德的核心和基本原则相冲突。“似乎有冲突，”我说，因为“需求权利”毕竟是一个技术术语，一旦明确表达出来，结论可能并不像最初听起来那样与我们共同的道德观点不一致。我认为这或多或少是吉尔伯特的立场。

这种明显的冲突将是我第一组评论的重点。我的第二组评论涉及吉尔伯特关于联合承诺（协议等）的规范性导入及其与道德要求的关系的观点。