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A co-opetitive newsvendor model with product substitution and a wholesale price contract
European Journal of Operational Research ( IF 6.4 ) Pub Date : 2023-05-05 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2023.04.036
Binwei Dong , Yufei Ren , Christopher McIntosh

When an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) sources key components from one contract manufacturer (CM), the CM may produce its own-brand product to compete against the OEM. Therefore, these two firms have a co-opetitive relationship. We develop a co-opetitive newsvendor model in which two newsvendors (OEM and CM) compete against each other in the format of product substitution. Moreover, the CM also serves as the only supplier to the OEM. We find that whether the CM’s final product is substitutable for the OEM’s product is the prerequisite condition that allows the CM to utilize its monopoly power in the key component market and earn extra profits. This result implies that being the only key component supplier of another newsvendor cannot automatically bring extra profits to the CM, except that the CM’s final product has a reasonable competitive advantage against the OEM’s final product. Furthermore, relative to the output of the purely competitive supply chain, the co-opetitive supply chain can achieve higher joint profits if the CM can fully compete against the OEM, i.e., the CM’s product can be treated as a perfect substitute for the OEM’s product. We also find that in the traditional selling to the newsvendor setting, when effective demand increases, the retailer (OEM) could be less profitable. Furthermore, we extend the discussion to the cases of horizontal decentralization and Nash bargaining. A parallel Cournot competition case is also discussed.



中文翻译:

具有产品替代和批发价格合同的竞争报童模型

当原始设备制造商 (OEM) 从合同制造商 (CM) 采购关键部件时,CM 可能会生产其自有品牌产品来与 OEM 竞争。因此,这两家公司存在竞合关系。我们开发了一种竞争性的报童模型,其中两个报童(OEM 和 CM)以产品替代的形式相互竞争。此外,CM还是OEM的唯一供应商。我们发现,CM的最终产品能否替代OEM的产品,是CM能够利用其在关键零部件市场的垄断地位,赚取额外利润的前提条件。这一结果意味着,作为另一家报童的唯一关键零部件供应商并不能自动为CM带来额外的利润,除非 CM 的最终产品相对于 OEM 的最终产品具有合理的竞争优势。此外,相对于纯竞争供应链的产出,如果CM能够与OEM充分竞争,那么竞合供应链就能获得更高的联合利润,即CM的产品可以被视为OEM产品的完美替代品。 。我们还发现,在传统的向报摊销售的情况下,当有效需求增加时,零售商(OEM)的利润可能会减少。此外,我们将讨论扩展到横向分权和纳什讨价还价的情况。还讨论了一个平行的古诺竞争案例。如果CM能够与OEM充分竞争,即CM的产品可以被视为OEM产品的完美替代品,那么竞合供应链就能获得更高的共同利润。我们还发现,在传统的向报摊销售的情况下,当有效需求增加时,零售商(OEM)的利润可能会减少。此外,我们将讨论扩展到横向分权和纳什讨价还价的情况。还讨论了一个平行的古诺竞争案例。如果CM能够与OEM充分竞争,即CM的产品可以被视为OEM产品的完美替代品,那么竞合供应链就能获得更高的共同利润。我们还发现,在传统的向报摊销售的情况下,当有效需求增加时,零售商(OEM)的利润可能会减少。此外,我们将讨论扩展到横向分权和纳什讨价还价的情况。还讨论了一个平行的古诺竞争案例。我们将讨论扩展到横向分权和纳什讨价还价的情况。还讨论了一个平行的古诺竞争案例。我们将讨论扩展到横向分权和纳什讨价还价的情况。还讨论了一个平行的古诺竞争案例。

更新日期:2023-05-05
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