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Earmarked Funding and the Control–Performance Trade-Off in International Development Organizations
International Organization ( IF 5.754 ) Pub Date : 2023-05-04 , DOI: 10.1017/s0020818323000085
Mirko Heinzel, Ben Cormier, Bernhard Reinsberg

Since the 1990s, the funding of multilateral development assistance has rapidly transformed. Donors increasingly constrain the discretion of international development organizations (IDOs) through earmarked funding, which limits the purposes for which a donor's funds can be used. The consequences of this development for IDOs’ operational performance are insufficiently understood. We hypothesize that increases in administrative burdens due to earmarked funding reduce the performance of IDO projects. The additional reporting required of IDOs by earmarked funds, while designed to enhance accountability, ultimately increases IDOs’ supervision costs and weakens their performance. We first test these hypotheses with data on project costs and performance of World Bank projects using both ordinary-least-squares and instrumental-variable analyses. We then probe the generalizability of those findings to other organizations by extending our analysis to four other IDOs: the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Using data on the performance of 7,571 projects approved between 1990 and 2020, we find that earmarked funding undermines both cost-effectiveness and project performance across IDOs. Donors seeking value for money may consider allocating more money to core funds rather than to earmarked funds.



中文翻译:

国际发展组织中的专项资金和控制-绩效权衡

自 1990 年代以来,多边发展援助的筹资方式迅速转变。捐助者通过指定用途的资金越来越多地限制国际开发组织 (IDO) 的自由裁量权,这限制了捐助者资金的使用目的。这种发展对 IDO 运营绩效的影响尚未得到充分理解。我们假设,由于专项资金导致的行政负担增加会降低 IDO 项目的绩效。专项资金要求 IDO 进行额外报告,虽然旨在加强问责制,但最终会增加 IDO 的监管成本并削弱其绩效。我们首先使用普通最小二乘法和工具变量分析,使用世界银行项目的项目成本和绩效数据来检验这些假设。然后,我们通过将分析扩展到其他四个 IDO,探讨这些发现对其他组织的普遍性:非洲开发银行 (AfDB)、亚洲开发银行 (ADB)、加勒比开发银行 (CDB) 和国际农业发展基金 (IFAD) ). 使用 1990 年至 2020 年间批准的 7,571 个项目的绩效数据,我们发现专项资金会破坏 IDO 的成本效益和项目绩效。寻求资金价值的捐助者可以考虑将更多资金分配给核心基金而不是专项资金。使用 1990 年至 2020 年间批准的 7,571 个项目的绩效数据,我们发现专项资金会破坏 IDO 的成本效益和项目绩效。寻求资金价值的捐助者可以考虑将更多资金分配给核心基金而不是专项资金。使用 1990 年至 2020 年间批准的 7,571 个项目的绩效数据,我们发现专项资金会破坏 IDO 的成本效益和项目绩效。寻求资金价值的捐助者可以考虑将更多资金分配给核心基金而不是专项资金。

更新日期:2023-05-04
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