Long Range Planning ( IF 7.825 ) Pub Date : 2023-04-19 , DOI: 10.1016/j.lrp.2023.102324 Valentina Fani , Dimitrija Kalanoski , Olivier Bertrand
This study investigates whether and when differences in the financial and fiscal regulatory systems between the countries of acquirers and targets that engage in cross-border M&As influence rivals' corporate responses. Drawing on the institutional arbitrage and competitive dynamics logics, we argue that cross-border M&As that provide opportunities for financial institutional gains for the targets and fiscal institutional gains for the acquirers pose a threat to the rivals and hence provoke an increase in the number of rivals' corporate responses. Additionally, we argue that the effect of cross-border M&As providing financial and fiscal institutional arbitrage opportunities on the number of rivals' corporate responses gets stronger with rivals' awareness, motivation, and capability to respond. An analysis of a unique dataset of rivals’ corporate activities before and after large horizontal cross-border M&As of their competitors in the manufacturing industry between 1999 and 2014 provides support for our main theoretical arguments and provides some contingent considerations.
中文翻译:
金融和财政制度套利机会的竞争效应:来自跨境并购的证据
本研究调查了从事跨国并购的收购方所在国和目标国之间的金融和财政监管体系差异是否以及何时会影响竞争对手的企业反应。借鉴制度套利和竞争动态逻辑,我们认为,为目标公司提供金融制度收益机会并为收购方提供财政制度收益机会的跨境并购对竞争对手构成威胁,从而引发竞争对手数量的增加' 企业回应。此外,我们认为,提供金融和财政制度套利机会的跨境并购对竞争对手企业回应数量的影响随着竞争对手的意识、动机和回应能力而增强。