A dynamic potential game theoretic production planning framework is presented in which production plants are treated as individual competing entities and competition occurs dynamically over a discrete finite time horizon. A modified Cournot oligopoly with sticky prices provides the basis for dynamic game theoretic competition in a multimarket nonlinear and nonconvex production planning model wherein market price adapts to a value that clears cumulative market supply. The framework is used to investigate a petrochemical refining scenario in which a single inefficient refiner faces elimination by its competitors; we demonstrate that there exist conditions under which the threatened refiner may upgrade itself to become competitive and escape the threat, or alternatively in which the threat of elimination is illegitimate and the refiner is effectively safe in the given market configuration. Globally optimal dynamic Nash equilibrium production trajectories are presented for each case. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers AIChE J, 2017

中文翻译：

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用于过程工厂竞争性升级和生产计划的动态博弈理论框架

提出了一个动态的潜在博弈理论的生产计划框架，其中生产工厂被视为单个竞争实体，并且竞争在离散的有限时间范围内动态发生。具有粘性价格的经过修改的古诺寡头寡头垄断为多市场非线性和非凸生产计划模型中的动态博弈论竞争提供了基础，其中市场价格适应于清除累积市场供应的价值。该框架用于调查石化炼制场景，在该场景中，单个效率低下的炼油厂将面临竞争对手的淘汰。我们证明，在某些情况下，受到威胁的精炼厂可能会升级自身以提高竞争力并摆脱威胁，或者在消除的威胁不合法的情况下，且精炼商在给定的市场配置下实际上是安全的。针对每种情况，给出了全局最优动态纳什均衡生产轨迹。©2017美国化学工程师学会AIChE的Ĵ，2017年